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R
ecent years have witnessed an upsurge of interest among monetary
policy analysts in the topic of simple and explicit rules for monetary
policy. In this recent work it is presumed that such rules would not be
followed literally and slavishly by central banks, but that they could be con-
sulted for indicative purposes—perhaps by providing a starting point for policy
discussions. Tangible evidence of this interest appears in publications based
on two 1998 conferences, both entitled “Monetary Policy Rules,” sponsored
by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and by the Sveriges
Riksbank in collaboration with Stockholm University’s Institute for Interna-
tional Economic Studies (IIES).1 Most of the work in these papers is based
on some variant of the now-famous Taylor rule. Introduced in Taylor (1993),
this rule speciﬁes settings of a nominal interest rate instrument in response to
observed or predicted values of inﬂation and the output gap (i.e., the percent-
age difference between output and its reference value2).3 Some of the studies
For comments, suggestions, or assistance I am indebted to Miguel Casares, Martin Gervais,
Marvin Goodfriend, Robert Hetzel, Yash Mehra, Allan Meltzer, Athanasios Orphanides, Ed-
ward Nelson, and Jeffrey Walker. The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 Proceedings of the NBER conference have been published in Taylor (1999b); papers
from the Riksbank-IIES conference appear in the June 1999 issue of the Journal of Monetary
Economics.
2 This reference value is deﬁned variously, in different studies, as the trend or capacity or
potential or natural-rate or market-clearing value of output.
3 In many of the studies, a lagged value of the interest rate is also included as a determinant
of the current value, thereby reﬂecting interest rate smoothing behavior.
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consider alternative instrument or target variables,4 and very recently some
criticisms of the Taylor rule have been expressed by Orphanides (1998, 1999),
Meltzer (1999), and others. Accordingly, the purpose of the present paper
is to conduct counterfactual historical analysis of the type used by Stuart
(1996) and Taylor (1999a), and to compare and consider the messages pro-
vided by Taylor’s rule with others featuring alternative instrument and/or target
variables.
The type of analysis developed by Stuart (1996) and Taylor (1999a) con-
sists of contrasting actual settings of instrument variables during some historical
time span with the values that would have been speciﬁed by particular rules in
response to prevailing conditions.5 Discrepancies or agreements between rule-
speciﬁed and actual values can then be evaluated, in light of ex-post judgements
concerning macroeconomic performance during the span studied, to yield tenta-
tive conclusions concerning the merits of the various rules. Of particular interest
is whether major policy mistakes, judged ex-post, would have been prevented
by adherence to some of the candidate rules. Stuart (1996) conducted such
comparisons for Taylor’s rule and also one promoted by McCallum (1987,
1993) that features a monetary base instrument and a nominal-income growth
target.6 The sample period utilized by Stuart was 1985.1 through 1996.2 for
the United States and the United Kingdom. This article will examine the years
spanning the early 1960s through 1998.4 for those two countries and the 1970s
through 1998.4 for Japan. The investigation will also extend the range of rules
considered by combining interest rate and monetary base instruments with both
Taylor-type and nominal-income target variables.
It should be said that no suggestion is intended to the effect that histor-
ical analysis of the Stuart-Taylor type represents the only useful approach to
policy-rule evaluation. Most of my work, in fact, has involved simulations with
quantitative structural macroeconomic models (e.g., McCallum, 1988, 1993;
McCallum and Nelson, 1999a, b). The premise is merely that the Stuart-Taylor
type of study can also be useful, in addition to simulations with structural mod-
els. In this regard, it is important to be clear about the nature of the exercise
involved, i.e., to appreciate its limitations and strengths—both of which are
considerable. Accordingly, these will be reviewed in Section 2, immediately
following the paper’s ﬁrst application of the Stuart-Taylor procedure.
The article proceeds as follows. In Section 1 the alternative rules are speci-
ﬁed, notation is established, and some general issues are discussed. Applications
to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan are then conducted in
Sections 2–4. Issues concerning the speciﬁcation of target variables are taken
4 See, for example, McCallum and Nelson (1999a, 1999b).
5 Other examples of such analysis include Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and Kozicki (1999).
6 In its growth-rate version, considered exclusively here and by Stuart (1996), McCallum’s
rule is similar (though not identical) to one promoted by Meltzer (1987).          
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up in Section 5 and others related to instrument variables in Section 6. Section
7 presents a brief conclusion.
1. SPECIFICATION OF RULES
The well-known Taylor rule can be expressed as follows:
Rt = ¯ r +∆ pa
t + 0.5(∆pa
t − π∗) + 0.5˜ yt. (1)
Here Rt is the short-term nominal interest rate that the central bank in question
uses as its instrument or “operating target,” i.e., the interest rate over which it
exerts control at a daily or weekly frequency. Next, ¯ r is the long-run average
real rate of interest, ∆pa
t is an average of recent inﬂation rates (or a forecast
value), and π∗ is the central bank’s target inﬂation rate. Finally, ˜ yt is a measure
of the output gap, the percentage difference between actual and capacity output
values. In Taylor’s original application (1993), the values ¯ r = 2 and π∗ = 2
were speciﬁed, expressing the belief that 2 percent per annum is an approxima-
tion to the long-run average real rate of interest in the United States, and that 2
percent per annum is a reasonable speciﬁcation for the Federal Reserve’s target
inﬂation rate.7 Also, in Taylor (1993) the measure used for ∆pa
t is the aver-
age of GDP deﬂator inﬂation rates over the past four quarters, while capacity
output is represented by a linear trend for the log of real GDP ﬁt to quarterly
observations for the years 1985–1992. In Taylor (1999a), the Hodrick-Prescott
(1997) ﬁlter is used instead to generate residuals from “trend” that are taken
to represent ˜ yt. The rule suggests, of course, that monetary policy should be
tightened (by an increase in Rt) when inﬂation exceeds its target value and/or
output exceeds capacity.
Subsequent applications of the Taylor rule have modiﬁed or extended for-
mula (1) in several ways. Some have used proxies for expected future inﬂation
in place of ∆pa
t while others have done something similar for ˜ yt or used ˜ yt−1
instead. A common and major change is to include Rt−1 on the right-hand
side as a determinant of Rt; this adjustment is intended to reﬂect the practice
of interest rate smoothing, which is widely believed to be prevalent in the
behavior of many central banks.
An important line of investigation has been pioneered by Orphanides (1998,
1999), who has attempted to base rule calculations on values of ∆pt (inﬂation)
and ˜ yt that were actually available to central bank policymakers at the time
that historical instrument settings were chosen. Orphanides (1998) recognizes
that current-period values for ˜ yt could not be known until after the end of
7 It is not necessary that constants be used for these values, but they are in Taylor (1993)
and for additional postwar periods in Taylor (1999a).         
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period t8 and also emphasizes that macroeconomic data is often substantially
revised after its initial reporting. In Orphanides (1999) it is argued that these
problems are so severe that adherence to the Taylor rule would not have pre-
vented the inﬂation of the 1970s, as claimed by Taylor (1999a). Partly for
reasons to be mentioned below in Section 5 and partly because of the difﬁculty
of doing otherwise, the present study will be based on data available in June
1999, not on real time data of the type recommended by Orphanides.
The rule proposed by McCallum (1987, 1988, 1993) can be expressed as
follows:
∆bt =∆ x∗ − ∆va
t + 0.5(∆x∗ − ∆xt−1). (2)
Here ∆bt is the change in the log of the adjusted monetary base, i.e., the
growth rate of the base between periods t − 1 and t. The term ∆x∗ is a target
growth rate for nominal GDP, ∆xt being the change in the log of nominal
GDP. This target value ∆x∗ is speciﬁed as π∗ +∆ y∗, where ∆y∗ is the long-
run average rate of growth of real GDP. The second term on the right-hand
side of (2), ∆va
t , is the average growth of base velocity over the previous 16
quarters, vt = xt − bt being the log of base velocity. This term is intended to
reﬂect long-lasting changes in the demand for the monetary base that occur
because of technological developments or regulatory changes (presumed to be
permanent); it is not intended to reﬂect cyclical conditions. These conditions
are responded to by the ﬁnal term, which prescribes that base growth is adjusted
upward (i.e., policy is loosened) when ∆xt−1 falls short of ∆x∗. In McCallum
(1988, 1993), values other than 0.5 are considered for the coefﬁcient attached
to ∆x∗ − ∆xt−1, and variants of (2) that respond to discrepancies of the level
type, rather than the growth rate type, are investigated. Here, however, we shall
limit our attention to the particular formulation given in (2).
A bit of discussion needs to be given to the topic of units of measurement.
In previous studies by McCallum, growth rate variables such as ∆xt have
been measured as changes in logs. Therefore such variables reﬂect quarterly
changes, instead of annualized changes, and are presented in fractional rather
than percentage units. Accordingly, such variables need to be multiplied by
400 to be commensurate with similar variables as measured by Taylor and
in most papers on policy rules. Similar comments pertain as well to interest
rate measures. To maintain consistency among the different rules considered,
we shall here report all results as annualized percentages, rather than in the
quarterly fractional units previously used in the work of McCallum.
Another detail of rule speciﬁcation concerns timing. In (2), both of the
variables on the right-hand side are based on variables realized in period t −1
or earlier; i.e., current-period values are not utilized. The reason, as suggested in
8 This type of operationality issue has been emphasized by McCallum and Nelson (1999b)
and McCallum (1999).          
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footnote 6, is to make the rule speciﬁcation realistically operational. In Taylor’s
studies, the inﬂation variable ∆pa
t is typically measured as referring only to
previous-period values, but it is assumed that ˜ yt pertains to period t. Since
current-quarter values of real GDP cannot be observed until well into the next
quarter, in the present study ˜ yt will be measured as the value of the output gap
variable (however measured) pertaining to the previous quarter.
Clearly, the Taylor and McCallum rules differ in regard to both instrument
and target variables.9 It is not obvious, however, why these should be paired in
any particular combination. It would be quite natural, that is, to consider a rule
with an interest rate instrument and a nominal income growth target. Similarly,
it would be reasonable to consider a rule with a base growth instrument and a
Taylor-style target speciﬁcation. Therefore, the investigation that follows will
also consider, in addition to (1) and (2), rules of the form
Rt = ¯ r +∆ pa
t − 0.5(∆x∗ − ∆xt−1) (3)
and
∆bt =∆ x∗ − ∆va
t − 0.5ht, (4)
where we deﬁne the “hybrid” target variable ht = (∆pa
t −π∗ + ˜ yt).10 Thus rule
(4) features responses to the same macroeconomic conditions as in Taylor’s
rule (1) but with a base instrument. Examination of the results involving (1)–
(4) should then enable one to determine whether differences in policy advice
offered by (1) and (2) are due primarily to their different instruments or targets.
2. UNITED STATES
We begin with the case of the United States. For xt,yt, and pt we use the
logarithms of nominal GDP, real (chain-linked) GDP, and their ratio. The mon-
etary base is the series computed by the St. Louis Fed, which incorporates
adjustments for changes in reserve requirements. In addition, an adjustment for
sweep accounts has been made for 1994–1998.11 Finally, Rt is the federal funds
rate averaged over the quarter. All variables except Rt are seasonally adjusted.
The series are taken from the FRED data base of the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. In what follows, ∆pa
t = 0.25(∆pt−1 +∆ pt−2 +∆ pt−3 +∆ pt−4)
9 Here I am using the term “target variable” to mean a variable that the policy rule responds to
in a manner designed to reduce its deviations from some reference path. Svensson (1999) objects
to this usage, preferring to reserve the word “target” for variables appearing in loss functions. For
a brief discussion see McCallum and Nelson (1999a).
10 The term “hybrid” was used for this variable by Hall and Mankiw (1994).
11 Speciﬁcally, 0.10 times the cumulative total of sweeps of transaction deposits into MM-
DAs, reported by FRED, are added to the adjusted base series. Here 0.10 represents the marginal
reserve requirement ratio.            
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while for ˜ yt we report the percentage excess (in period t − 1) of output over
a “trend” reference value provided by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter, as in
Taylor (1999a). The effect of the latter choice will be discussed below, in
Section 5.
Figure 1 plots values of Rt implied by the Taylor rule (1) with π∗ = 2
and ¯ r = 2 together with actual values over the period 1960–1998.12 From this
ﬁgure, it can be seen that the actual interest rate was lower than the rule-implied
value throughout the 1970s, indicating that monetary policy was too loose,
according to the rule. Beginning in 1981, policy was too tight until 1987, the
ﬁrst year considered in Taylor’s original study (1993). Over 1987–1995 policy
was about right, according to the ﬁgure, but since 1996, it has been somewhat
too tight.
As mentioned above, it is important to recognize the limitations and virtues
of the type of comparison provided by Figure 1. If in a particular period the
actual value of Rt was lower than the rule-speciﬁed value, then the rule’s indica-
tion is that policy was too loose in that period, given the prevailing conditions.
There is no suggestion that the actual setting of Rt in that period was too low
unconditionally. Indeed, the presumption of Stuart (1996) and Taylor (1999a),
which we adopt here, is that prevailing inﬂation would have been lower during
the 1970s if Taylor’s rule had been followed in practice. So the Rt settings that
would have been appropriate, according to rule (1), would have been lower
than those indicated by the solid line in Figure 1.13 Thus the solid line in this
ﬁgure does not pretend to represent an optimal or even desirable path for Rt
over the period. But that does not prevent the comparison of the two lines from
indicating that, conditional upon prevailing conditions, actual Rt values were
set lower than the rule would have speciﬁed in virtually every period during
the ’70s. From the standpoint of rule (1), therefore, monetary policy was too
loose during the ’70s. That is the only type of conclusion provided by Figure
1, and other such plots presented below.
Thus the principal weakness of this type of comparison is that it does not
indicate what “optimal” policy settings would have been or even what time
path crucial variables would have followed under the rule being examined.
But there is an offsetting virtue. Any designation of optimality—indeed, any
speciﬁcation of how Rt or other variables would have evolved historically under
any speciﬁed policy rule—is necessarily dependent upon the speciﬁc model of
the economy used to predict how ∆pt and ˜ yt would have responded to Rt
settings. The Stuart-Taylor procedure, by contrast, does not require adoption
of any speciﬁc model. This feature is deﬁnitely advantageous, because there is
12 Since our data base is for 1960.1–1998.4, rule-implied values begin with 1961.2 because
lagged values are needed to determine ∆pa
t .
13 If ∆pa
t had been lower in each period, the Rt values prescribed by (1) would have been
lower.           
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Figure 1 U.S. Interest Rates, Actual and Implied by Rule (1)
no professional agreement concerning the proper speciﬁcation of the “correct”
model of the economy.14
We now return to the main line of analysis and move on to rule (2). For its
application, we take ∆x∗ = 5, combining a 2 percent inﬂation target with an
assumed long-run average output growth rate of 3 percent per year.15 The com-
parison of base growth values implied by rule (2) with actual historical values
is presented in Figure 2.16 There it will be seen that policy was too loose—
actual base growth was greater than speciﬁed by the rule—during the second
half of the ’60s and much too loose throughout the ’70s. This discrepancy was
gradually reduced between 1981 and 1987. Then policy became slightly too
loose during 1990–1992 and too tight during 1994–1995, according to the rule.
Since 1995 it has been about right, on average, although the ﬁnal observation
of 1998 suggests slightly excessive base growth at that date.
14 For an elaboration on this last point, see McCallum (1999, pp. 1490–1). As mentioned in
the introduction, the purpose of the present digression is not to object to counter-factual simula-
tion studies, based on speciﬁc models, but only to argue that different procedures have different
strengths and weaknesses.
15 The value of 3 percent for output growth was used in McCallum (1987, 1988)—together
with an inﬂation target of 0 percent—and in subsequent studies. The actual average over 1960–
1998 was 2.97 percent.
16 Rule values begin with 1964.2 because of the lags needed to calculate va
t .      
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Figure 2 U.S. Base Growth, Actual and Rule (2)
Figure 3 gives results for rule (4), which combines the base instrument (as
in (2)) with the hybrid target variable (as in (1)). Somewhat surprisingly, the
overall characterization of the results can be described with the same words
used for the base rule (2). The main difference is that the rule-indicated path
of ∆bt has less quarter-to-quarter variability than in Figure 2. The reason,
evidently, is that (4) does not respond to quarter-to-quarter movements in the
growth rate of output (real GDP), which are quite volatile. The basic message
provided by the hybrid target variable is much the same as that provided by
nominal GDP growth because the HP ﬁlter yields quite small values for the
output gap, as will be illustrated below. Therefore, ht and ∆xt behave alike
except for the volatility introduced into the latter by the yt component.
Results with rule (3), featuring the interest rate instrument with a nominal
GDP growth target variable, are shown in Figure 4. Here the broad overall
signals are much like those of Figure 1, which features the Taylor rule, except
with a more erratic path because of the output growth component of the target
variable. So the comparison among the four ﬁgures suggests that the choice
of an instrument variable matters more for the trend of monetary policy than
the choice of a target variable. It should be emphasized, however, that this
preliminary conclusion pertains only to the nominal GDP growth and hybrid
variables, with the output gap component of the latter determined by the HP
ﬁlter method.  
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Figure 3 U.S. Base Growth, Actual and Rule (4)
Figure 4 U.S. Interest Rate, Actual and Rule (3)            
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3. UNITED KINGDOM
Before delving more deeply into the comparisons among the rules, let us look
at the basic cases using data for the United Kingdom. Again xt,yt, and pt are
logs of nominal GDP, real GDP, and their ratio. For the monetary base bt we
use the Bank of England’s M0 measure, seasonally adjusted, which requires no
adjustments for reserve requirements because the latter are small enough to be
negligible.17 The interest rate used is a one-month Treasury-bill rate, averaged
over the quarter. For the United Kingdom, we use a value of 2.25 for ¯ r,2
for π∗, and 2.25 for ∆y∗. Thus ∆x∗ = 4.25. The output gap measure is the
percentage departure of real GDP from trend, obtained from the residuals from
a regression of the log of real GDP on a linear trend ﬁtted over the years 1960–
1998.
Results using the Taylor rule (1) are shown in Figure 5. The indication
there is that monetary policy was much too loose during the 1970s, with the
rule calling for an interest rate of 38 percent in 1975.3, as compared with an
actual value of 10.4.18 From 1983 through 1987 policy was slightly too tight,
according to the rule, and since 1987 it has been just about right, except perhaps
in 1994.
The McCallum rule (2) presents a somewhat different story, as can be seen
in Figure 6. It agrees that policy was much too loose during the ’70s, but
suggests that it stayed too loose most of the time until 1990 (when the U.K.
entered the European Union’s exchange rate mechanism in October, dropping
out in September 1992). Since 1992, policy was slightly loose, according to
Figure 6, until 1997 when it became just about right. The main difference in
the messages of Figures 5 and 6 is that the latter suggests that policy was too
loose during the mid–1980s. Ex-post, this suggestion seems correct, as U.K.
inﬂation rose to excessive heights prior to 1990—probably as a consequence
of the episode of “shadowing the D-mark” that occurred during 1986–1988.
As in the case of the United States, the messages from rules (3) and (4)
tend to agree when the instrument, not the target variable, is the same. Thus
in Figure 7 we have base growth ﬁgures implied by rule (4), with the hybrid
target variable, and the policy messages are much the same as in Figure 6,
but with less quarter-to-quarter variability of the indicated ∆bt values. Also, in
Figure 8, plotted for an interest instrument and a ∆xt target, we ﬁnd substantial
agreement with the indications of Figure 5, which pertains to the Taylor rule.
Agreement is incomplete, however, since this rule does not call for looser policy
in the mid–1980s.
17 Data for M0 are published by the Bank of England for 1969.3–1998.4. Earlier values were
obtained from Capie and Webber (1985) and spliced on.
18 Of course if rule (1) had been followed throughout, actual inﬂation would probably have
been much less severe and the values of Rt indicated by the rule would have been much lower.  
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Figure 5 U.K. Interest Rate, Actual and Rule (1)
Figure 6 U.K. Base Growth, Actual and Rule (2)  
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Figure 7 U.K. Base Growth, Actual and Rule (4)
Figure 8 U.K. Interest Rate, Actual and Rule (3)          
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4. JAPAN
In the case of Japan, our rules will be applied only to the period 1972.1–
1998.4, rather than a time span beginning in the early ’60s. The reasons are
that Japanese data for constructing a monetary base series does not exist prior
to 1963; that Japan kept a ﬁxed exchange rate with the U.S. dollar prior to
1971; and that there was a marked break in the growth rate of Japanese real
GDP around 1971 or 1972.19 For the subsequent period we use ¯ r = 3, a higher
value than that for the United States or the United Kingdom, because real
output growth was higher in Japan. Nevertheless, for ∆x∗ we adopt a value of
5, corresponding to an average long-run real output growth rate of 3 percent
and, again, a target inﬂation rate of π∗ = 2 percent. In measuring the output
gap ˜ yt we cannot use either the HP ﬁlter or a linear trend because output in
1998 was quite far below capacity, in the judgement of most observers. Instead,
we have measured the fractional gap over 1972.1–1992.2 as the residual from
a regression of the log of real GDP on a linear trend (ﬁtted to 1972.1–1992.4
observations), and have assumed that trend or capacity output grew at a rate
of 2.5 percent per annum since 1992.2. This procedure yields a gap that grows
to a ﬁgure of 11.2 percent for 1998.4.
The Bank of Japan now publishes four monthly data series on the mone-
tary base, beginning in 1970, with and without adjustments for seasonality and
reserve requirement changes. The monthly series with both adjustments was
averaged to generate values for 1970.1–1998 and data from McCallum (1993)
was spliced on to cover 1963.1–1969.4. (Values prior to 1967.4 were not used
in the study, however.) For Rt the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) was
used and ofﬁcial GDP statistics provided the basis for the remaining variables.
Application of Taylor’s rule (1) to Japan for 1972.1–1998.4 is depicted in
Figure 9. There the indications are that policy should have been much tighter
during 1973–1974 and somewhat tighter over 1975–1978. Policy was slightly
too tight most of the time over 1982–1987, and then about right until 1994.
Since then it has been too tight most of the time, but not in 1997. At the end
of 1998, the call rate was almost 4 percentage points too high, the Taylor rule-
indicated value being −3.6 percent. Of course, the latter value is not feasible,
but it indicates that the rule calls for much more stimulative policy than actually
prevailed in late 1998.
This last message is also provided by the base rule (2), as shown in Figure
10, but to an even greater extent. Indeed, this rule suggests that monetary policy
has been too tight most of the time since the middle of 1990. Like (1), it points
to a too-loose stance over 1972–1978. Interestingly, in light of the “asset-price
bubble” of the late 1980s, Figure 10 indicates that monetary policy was slightly
too loose during 1986–1988.
19 For these reasons McCallum (1993) begins its rule study with the quarter 1972.1.  
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Figure 9 Japan Interest Rate, Actual and Rule (1)
Figure 10 Japan Base Growth, Actual and Rule (2)  
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Figure 11 Japan Base Growth, Actual and Rule (4)
Figure 12 Japan Interest Rate, Actual and Rule (3)      
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We now turn to rules (3) and (4). Figure 11 shows that in the case of Japan,
rule (4) again gives much the same signals as does the other rule with the ∆bt
instrument, rule (2). Also, as in previous cases, the hybrid target variable yields
a smoother path for base growth than does (2). As for the interest rate rule with
a nominal GDP growth target, rule (3), Figure 12’s results are more similar to
those in Figure 9 than in Figure 10. The extent to which rule (3) calls for added
stimulus in recent years is even less than in Figure 9, however. The rule does
call for easier policy in the last half of 1998, but ﬁnds policy about right during
1995–1997.
5. ISSUES CONCERNING TARGET VARIABLES
One of the main preliminary indications of our previous discussion is that rules
with ∆xt and ht target variables give rather similar policy signals, provided that
the instrument variable is the same. This notion needs to be strongly qualiﬁed,
however, as follows. The main point is that the similarity of ∆xt and ht signals
observed in Sections 2–4 depends upon the use of output gap measures that do
not yield large numerical magnitudes over the time span studied. In the case
of the United States, the measure used was based on residuals from the HP
ﬁlter. The standard deviation of these values over 1960–1998 is only 1.63, in
percentage points. If instead the output gap measure was based on residuals
from a linear trend (for the log of real GDP), the standard deviation would be
4.15 and the impact of the gap measure would be signiﬁcantly greater. In that
case the Taylor rule vs. actual comparison, comparable to Figure 1, would be
as shown in Figure 13. Here the monetary policy message is not drastically
different from that of Figure 1 for the subperiod 1966–1990, although the need
for tighter policy during the ’70s would be more clearly indicated. But for the
early ’60s and the late ’90s the message would be quite different, with lower
interest rates indicated by the gap based on the log-linear detrending. According
to the Figure 13 version of the Taylor rule, the federal funds rate was too high
by about 300 basis points throughout 1995–1998!
It is my belief that reliance of a policy rule upon any output gap measure is
risky, for different measures give quite different values and there is at present no
professional consensus on an appropriate measure—or even a concept. Linear
detrending depends rather sensitively on the time period selected for ﬁtting of
the trend, as is illustrated in Figure 14, where gap measures based on log-
linear trends ﬁtted over 1960–1998 and 1980–1998 are shown, together with
values based on the HP ﬁlter. One might suggest that quadratic detrending could
alleviate this problem, but quadratic trends are themselves rather sensitive to
the time period selected for ﬁtting. This claim is supported by Figure 15, which
shows gap measures based on quadratic trends for the log of real U.S. GDP
ﬁtted over the time periods 1960.1–1998.4 and 1980.1–1998.4. As can be seen
there, these measures often differ by as much as 3 percentage points.  
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Figure 13 U.S. Rule (1) with Output Gaps Based on
Log-Linear Detrending, 1960–1998
Figure 14 U.S. Output Gaps Based on HP Filter and
Log-Linear Detrending, 1960–1998 and 1980–1998     
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With respect to the HP ﬁlter, the problem is that this procedure produces
a “trend” that is so ﬂexible that it follows the time path of actual GDP rather
closely. Consequently, measures of the output gap are generated that would
appear to underestimate (in absolute terms) the economically relevant gap
values.20 To illustrate this point, Figure 16 shows how the HP ﬁlter handles
U.S. observations on real GDP during the ’20s and ’30s. According to this
ﬁgure, U.S. output had fully returned to “trend” by 1934 and the incidence of
above-trend output was approximately the same as below-trend output during
the ’30s, suggesting that the Great Depression actually did not occur.
More fundamentally, McCallum and Nelson (1999b) argue that any gap
measure based on an output detrending procedure, which excludes the effects
of current shocks from the measured gap, is conceptually inappropriate. The
point is that (e.g.) positive technology shocks serve to increase the capacity
or natural-rate value of output, not the value of actual output relative to the
latter; but many univariate detrending procedures presume just the opposite.
To overcome this difﬁculty, McCallum and Nelson (1999b) propose a measure
based on the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function and utilizing
values of manhours employed per member of the civilian workforce. This mea-
sure treats technological change appropriately, at least arguably, but relies upon
debatable assumptions about labor supply and does not have a well-deﬁned zero
value.
As mentioned above, the recent work of Orphanides (1998, 1999) has
attracted considerable attention. In the earlier of the cited papers, Orphanides
constructed data series for 1987–1992 reﬂecting values of macroeconomic vari-
ables that were actually available at the time of (FOMC) policy decisions in
the past. These series do not, accordingly, reﬂect data revisions and measure-
ments that have taken place after the FOMC meetings at which instrument
settings (usually values of the federal funds rate) were actually decided. In this
context, the measurement of “potential” or “natural-rate” output is especially
problematic. This study indicated that the magnitude of the informational prob-
lems were serious enough that “real-time policy recommendations differ widely
from those obtained with the revised published data employed [by researchers]
later on” (Orphanides, 1998, p. 3). The broad overall policy messages offered
by the Taylor rule for 1987–1992 are not overturned, however, by the results
of the 1997 study.
The results in Orphanides (1999) are more drastic. In this later work, the
time span studied goes back to 1966.1 and so includes the major inﬂationary
buildup and continuation that Taylor (1999a) refers to as “The Great Inﬂation.”
Orphanides’ dramatic conclusion is that adherence to Taylor’s rule throughout
20 The present discussion presumes adoption of the standard value of 1600 for the HP ﬁlter’s
smoothing coefﬁcient in work with quarterly data.  
B. T. McCallum: Alternative Monetary Policy Rules 67
Figure 15 U.S. Gap Measures Based on Log-Quadratic Detrending,
1960–1998 and 1980–1998
Figure 16 U.S. Real GNP and HP Trend, 1921–1939
+         
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the period would not, in constrast to Taylor’s (1999a, pp. 338–39) contention,
have prevented the Great Inﬂation.
Developing an appropriate evaluation of Orphanides’ (1999) analysis is not
a trivial undertaking. Certainly Orphanides’ reconstruction of the data repre-
sents a major contribution to economic policy analysis; moreover, his arguments
are carefully constructed and exposited. In my judgement, they do not imply
that simple monetary policy rules cannot be useful when constrained by real-
time data availability. Instead, I believe, the (1999) study shows in a striking
fashion that reliance on an inappropriate concept of potential (or reference)
output can be ruinous, i.e., can result in a monetary policy rule that is counter-
productive. But some rules do not rely upon such measures, as the examples
of Sections 2 through 4 above illustrate.21 Also, the truly dramatic results in
Orphanides (1999) stem from a potential output concept revision, rather than
a data revision. Thus, although the data-revision problem is not of negligible
signiﬁcance, it is not as profound as a quick reading of Orphanides (1999)
might suggest. In my view, it seems satisfactory to abstract from that problem
for the purposes of the present study.
Given the foregoing argument and the ﬁndings of Sections 2–4, a natural
step would be to investigate the performance of rules that use inﬂation as
the target variable, i.e., the cyclical variable responded to by the instrument.
Accordingly, we now present ﬁgures based on the two policy rules
Rt = ¯ r +∆ pa
t + 0.5(∆pa
t − π∗) (5)
∆bt =∆ x∗ − ∆va
t − 0.5(∆pa
t − π∗), (6)
which can be compared with (1) and (4). The results are shown in Figures
17-22. For the United States, the interest rate rule in Figure 17 calls for Rt
values quite close to those of Figure 1. Also, the base growth rule in Figure
18 yields settings for ∆bt that are rather close to those shown in Figure 3,
in which the rule responds to the hybrid target variable. Likewise, the plots in
Figures 19 and 20 for the United Kingdom are fairly similar to those in Figures
5 and 7. For Japan, however, the policy advice for recent years provided by
the inﬂation-target rule in Figure 21 is quite different than that in Figure 9. In
particular, in the absence of an output gap signal, rule (5) calls for Rt settings
somewhat higher than actual values during 1997 and 1998. The base rule (6)
results in Figure 22 remain more stimulative than the actual record for recent
years, but to a lesser extent than in Figure 11.
21 This conclusion is basically consistent with Orphanides’ warning against “activist” policy
rules, by which he means rules that place emphasis on measures of the level of an output gap
concept. Orphanides ﬁnds that a rule featuring “natural growth targeting,” which is rather similar
to nominal income growth targeting as in rules (2) or (3) above, is not strongly subject to the
difﬁculties that he emphasizes.  
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Figure 17 U.S. Interest Rate, Actual and Rule (5)
Figure 18 U.S. Base Growth, Actual and Rule (6)  
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Figure 19 U.K. Interest Rate, Actual and Rule (5)
Figure 20 U.K. Base Growth, Actual and Rule (6)  
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Figure 21 Japan Interest Rate, Actual and Rule (5)
Figure 22 Japan Base Growth, Actual and Rule (6)          
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One attractive aspect of the inﬂation target variable ∆pa
t relative to the
nominal income variable ∆xt−1 is that the former features smaller quarter-to-
quarter movements and therefore imparts a smoother, less choppy path to the
instrument variables in (5) and (6), in comparison to (2) and (3). One reason
for this, certainly, is that ∆pa
t reﬂects four-quarter averaging while ∆xt−1 does
not. Accordingly, it should be of some interest to see how the nominal income
variable would perform if averaged over periods t − 1 through t − 4. Results
with that modiﬁcation are presented in Figures 23-28. In these plots, it can be
seen that the choppiness of rules with a nominal GDP growth target is reduced
substantially, although the implied instrument settings remain slightly more
variable than with the inﬂation target. Are there any compensating advantages
of the averaged ∆x values relative to the averaged ∆p values? For the United
States and the United Kingdom, the policy advice seems to be basically the
same in Figures 23–26 as in Figures 17–20. In the case of Japan, however,
the nominal income targets in Figures 27–28 give more stimulative signals
than with inﬂation targeting (Figures 21–22), which seems desirable. But the
magnitude is not very large.
6. ISSUES CONCERNING INSTRUMENT VARIABLES
One of the more surprising aspects of the results in Sections 2–4 is that the
policy diagnoses provided by the various rules seem to be more dependent
upon the instrument variable used than upon the choice of target variable.
This indication seems inconsistent with most analysts’ beliefs about monetary
policy design. Reﬂection upon the role and nature of the rules makes this
ﬁnding understandable, however, in the following manner. First, the way in
which the rules are used in a study such as the present one implies that the
rule-speciﬁed instrument settings are actually serving as magnitudes of indi-
cator variables, not instruments. That is, one could view the resulting values
for quarterly settings of Rt or ∆bt as intermediate targets to be obtained by
day-to-day or week-to-week manipulation of other variables that serve as the
central bank’s instrument.22 Second, the policy stance—i.e., degree of tightness
or ease—represented by rule-speciﬁed settings of Rt or ∆bt depends upon the
magnitude of those variables relative to some reference value that can vary
from period to period. In the case of the Taylor rule (1) the reference value
is ¯ r +∆ pa
t , which serves to convert Rt movements into movements in a real
interest rate measured relative to ¯ r, since Rt−(¯ r+∆pa
t ) = (Rt−∆pa
t )−¯ r. With
the McCallum rule (2), the reference value for ∆bt is ∆x∗ −∆va
t . In this case,
22 A study that proceeds in this fashion is McCallum (1995), which considers how the U.S.
federal funds rate could be manipulated on a week-to-week basis to hit quarterly intermediate
targets for monetary base growth with the latter set so as to keep nominal income growth close
to a speciﬁed target value.  
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Figure 23 U.S. Interest Rate, Actual and Rule with
Averaged Nominal Income Growth
Figure 24 U.S. Base Growth, Actual and Rule with
Averaged Nominal Income Growth  
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Figure 25 U.K. Interest Rate, Actual and Rule with
Averaged Nominal Income Growth
Figure 26 U.K. Base Growth, Actual and Rule with
Averaged Nominal Income Growth  
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Figure 27 Japan Interest Rate, Actual and Rule with
Averaged Nominal Income Growth
Figure 28 Japan Base Growth, Actual and Rule with
Averaged Nominal Income Growth          
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∆bt − (∆x∗ − ∆va
t ) reﬂects the difference between ∆bt and the value of base
growth that would yield an inﬂation rate of π∗ if output growth were equal to
its long-run average value and base velocity growth were equal to its average
over the past 16 quarters (a value that is implicitly being used as a forecast of
the average over the indeﬁnite future).
In each case, in other words, a necessary reference variable must be spec-
iﬁed to convert raw values of Rt or ∆bt into measures of monetary ease or
tightness.23 Therefore the precise speciﬁcation of these reference variables is
of considerable importance to a rule’s performance. If rules are to be rela-
tively simple, it is necessary that the speciﬁcation of these reference values be
simple—hence Taylor’s speciﬁcation of a constant “equilibrium” real rate of
interest or McCallum’s constant “long-run growth rate of output.” Evidently,
however, the properties of any rule will depend critically upon how these ref-
erence values are speciﬁed. Consequently, it would appear that future research
should perhaps devote more attention to this aspect of policy rule speciﬁcation.
To date, researchers have instead directed most of their attention to the choice
among target variables, details of their speciﬁcation, and the magnitude of
coefﬁcients attached to them.
7. CONCLUSION
Let us close with a brief summary of the ﬁndings developed above, based on
historical policy-rule studies for the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Japan. The basic results in this study come from comparisons of actual values
with rule speciﬁcations involving either interest-rate or monetary-base instru-
ment settings and nominal GDP growth or Taylor-style hybrid (inﬂation plus
output gap) target variables. For the United States, all of the rules considered
would have called for tighter monetary policy during the ’70s, although the
base-instrument rules would have done so more strongly than those with the
Fed’s actual funds-rate instrument. There is some disagreement among the rules
concerning the ’80s and ’90s, although all of the candidate rules indicate that
policy has not been highly inappropriate since 1987. For the United Kingdom,
the various rules agree regarding the excessive inﬂation of the ’70s, but the
base-instrument rules suggest that policy was too loose during the middle and
late ’80s whereas the interest-instrument rules do not. In the case of Japan,
interest centers on the record since 1990. Most of the rules indicate that policy
was too tight in 1998, but the base rules suggest excessive tightness for the
entire period 1990–1998, while the interest rate rules do not. All in all, the
recommendations provided by the base rules seem somewhat more appropriate
from an ex-post perspective.
23 This statement applies to all of the rules, of course, not just (1) and (2).       
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Some of the study’s suggestions are methodological, rather than substan-
tive. In particular it is argued that reliance on output gap measures is risky,
because various measures of potential or natural-rate output levels differ widely
and there is no professional consensus on the most appropriate measure or even
concept to be used. Most univariate detrending procedures, which are frequently
utilized, would seem to be fundamentally inappropriate, because they assign
the effects of technology shocks primarily to the gap between output and its
reference value, rather than to the latter variable itself. Omitting the output gap
term from a rule with the hybrid target converts it into an inﬂation targeting
rule; we show that such rules give good advice in most of the episodes. So,
too, do nominal income growth rules that average recent values.
A somewhat surprising ﬁnding is that rules’ messages are evidently more
dependent upon which instrument rather than which target variable is used.24
This ﬁnding can be understood as resulting from the necessity of specifying a
reference value, relative to which instrument settings are implicitly compared,
in representing policy tightness or ease. For rules to be sufﬁciently simple,
these reference-value speciﬁcations must themselves be simple, but different
implicit assumptions about macroeconomic behavior are thereby built into the
rule. The paper suggests, consequently, that investigation of these implicit
assumptions could be an important topic for future research on alternative
monetary policy rules.
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